The making of Southeast Asia: International Relations of a region by Amitav Acharya. 2012 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.

The preface of Acharya’s book underscores the principal assumption driving his argument: that regions are socially constructed. In other words, the policymaking elite’s desire for a Southeast Asian regional identity coupled with “intraregional patterns of interaction, play a crucial role in the making of Southeast Asia as a region” (p. xi). The book builds on the first edition published by Oxford University Press under the title The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia in 2000. The second edition contains two new chapters, one of which (chapter 2) draws upon secondary (historical and anthropological) literature and the second (chapter 8) explores several non-traditional security threats facing the region. To complement this lengthy text, Acharya also adds an interesting collection of historical pictures interspaced in different sections of the book. This brings the book to a hefty 410 pages divided into nine chapters. 

The book begins by addressing the elephant in the room: can one reconcile “the region’s immense diversity” and its numerous “countervailing forces” (p. 1) to devise a Southeast Asian identity? Acharya’s argument is that Southeast Asia can be viewed as a ‘region’ with a strong sense of regionalism driving regional integration. In his view, “diversity is not a deterrent to apply the label of region to Southeast Asia” (p. 5). In the opening chapter, Acharya claims that regional perspectives on Southeast Asian politics and international relations remain scarce. He argues that scholarly studies often adopt “externalist” perspectives by comparing Southeast Asia to other regions and conclude that the former’s intraregional interaction is not comparable to other “coherent regions” (p. 2). By quoting several scholars, he makes the case that “important post war (Post World War 2) texts devoted to Southeast Asia consists of chapters on individual countries and pay little attention to the region as a whole” (p. 2).

Acharya justifies the adoption of ‘international relations’ in the subtitle of his book at the onset. He argues that “the history of Southeast Asia’s international relations is, to a great extent, a history of attempts to forge regional unity” (p. 3). In other words, because much of the impetus for regionalism and a regional identity was born out of post-independence foreign policy decisions, the latter’s development is intrinsically tied to the relations between Southeast Asia states. Thus, Acharya firmly establishes International Relations as the lens through which he assesses the emergence of the Southeast Asian identity.

Acharya also tackles the main arguments advanced by scholars who do not view Southeast Asia as a region. In response to claims that differences in language and between the mainland and maritime parts of Southeast Asia create irrevocable differences, Acharya affirms that “cultural and political interactions took place within and across the continental and maritime domains long before the colonial era” (p. 8). He goes on to adopt Fisher’s regional conceptualization by affirming that Southeast Asia can be distinguished from the rest of Asia owing to the following: first, Southeast Asia lies wholly in the humid tropics while parts of India are within a temperate zone, secondly “the remoteness of the region from human settlements in the vast continental interior of Asia and the related fact of its location as a maritime crossroads” (p. 9) and finally that the geographical and geological complexity of India and China pales in comparison to Southeast Asia. By adopting this line of reasoning, Acharya does not discount the diversity within Southeast Asia but instead contends that differentiating Southeast Asia from the rest of Asia is more empirically important. Moreover, diversity within Southeast Asia should not be grounds to dismiss the idea of “studying the dynamic, interactive and ideational factors that create” the region of Southeast Asia (p. 10).

Chapters 2 and 3 draws on an extensive array of historical studies which Acharya rationalizes by stating that “secondary sources, especially those written by eminent scholars of Southeast Asia, become primary material” because they imagined “regionness” (p. 34). To what extent this conceptualization (of convoluting primary and secondary sources) can be justified is a moot point, especially because some historians continue to dispute the boundaries of Southeast Asia and even whether the idea of Southeast Asia is a marker of geopolitical convenience as against an actual identity-based region as Acharya claims.

Acharya’s constructivist perspective is informed by Anderson’s work on Nationalism. By slightly altering Anderson’s argument, Acharya maintains that “regions are socially constructed rather than geographically or ethno-socially preordained” (p. 12) which warrants examining Southeast Asia as a region built on a regional identity driven by regionalism. He contends that by ‘imagined’, “I mean an idea of the region” and by socially constructed “I imply that regional coherence result primarily from self-conscious socialization among the leaders and peoples of a region” (p. 23).

Acharya identifies regionalism as a process which involves “intraregional interdependence, institution-building and regional identity” creation. Homogenization, required for the latter, is achieved through “a diffusion of norms, policies and practices of regional organizations and associations, formal and informal” (p. 26). While Chapters 4 through 7 discuss how regional identity is built, it is important to note that Acharya focusses on a top-down identity creation (i.e., from an elite level) as against assessing how social and economic interactions within the region created a bottom-up regional identity. To claim therefore, that a regional identity is forged by examining the post-colonial states’ international relations leads the reader to question whether a top down or elite driven regional identity creation actually trickles down to the general public in Southeast Asia or not. One could make a case that Acharya’s argument would have been strengthened had he employed interview or survey data of the general public to verify this.  

In order to reconcile the fact that Acharya adopts a nation building approach to a region building exercise, he argues that “regional identities complement rather than replace state and national identities” (p. 24). However, in chapters 6 and 7 Acharya’s empirical research demonstrates several instances where nationalism was at odds with the formation of a regional identity. The fact that Acharya does not acknowledge this at the outset of the text gives the reader an idealistic image of the regional identity creation process until s/he encounters chapters 6 and 7. In his conclusion, however, Acharya draws a somewhat sobering image, accepting that nationalism may have “undermined prospects for (deeper and faster progress in) regionalism” (p. 292). Consequently, the reader gets an impression that Acharya’s assumption changed over the course of this text.

Vietnamese communists for instance saw regionalism as a means of “advancing their goal of national liberation” (p. 108). Even so, this support was short-lived because once the Vietnamese communists realized that regionalism was failing to advance the cause of national liberation, they strongly opposed regional efforts to build a regional organization. Efforts at enhancing a regional identity also suffered as a result of divergent ideological positions. Philippines and Thailand argued that the greatest threat facing Southeast Asia emanates from Communism and that the United States should remain firmly ingrained in regional affairs. Indonesia, on the other hand, felt that the latter would challenge its ascendancy as a regional leader and consequently opposed this. Even Acharya, at a later point in the text acknowledges that nationalist leaders in Southeast Asia accepted that “their ties to former colonial powers were often much stronger than those to their own neighbors” (p. 115).

The challenge nationalism posed to regionalism was one among many internal issues challenging the progress of regionalism and regional identity creation. Other factors include identity based and ideological based contentions (particularly from the threat of communist forces) as well as ethnic separatism and its associated challenge to regime survival, which diverted governments away from region building efforts (p. 122). Apprehensions concerning the establishment of a formal regional architecture also impeded the speed of regional identity building. For instance, Sihanouk of Cambodia was under the impression that the ASEAN was a “patently pro-Western and anti-Chinese” initiative which he had no interest in joining even though the ASEAN invited Cambodia to be a member (p. 156). Similarly, Myanmar also refused on the grounds that the presence of the US military bases in the Philippines was a violation of the latter’s ability to make independent decisions as a member of the organization. 

Acharya maintains that the “smallness of Southeast Asian countries” and their “inability to achieve self-reliance without collective efforts” motivated their desire to pursue regionalism. However, even so, bilateral and plurilateral tensions negatively affected the progress of regionalism. A notable case is the Konfrantasi. Acharya unfortunately gives passing reference to this as a “problem” discounting the hurdle this may have placed on efforts to strengthen regionalism in Southeast Asia (p. 126).

The book distinguishes between the conceptual exercises of “region-naming” and region-building. In his view “while the ‘naming’ of Southeast Asia may have been accomplished by Allied Powers and Cold War geopolitics”, region-building is an outcome of regionalism and a regional identity creation process. As a consequence, regional building cannot be ascribed as an outcome of external factors alone (p. 37). In fact, Acharya’s constructivist argument is that the process is more internally driven than exogenously created. However, whether one can add East Timor into Southeast Asia and how identity-based patterns of socialization can reconcile having a “single coherent whole” (p. 41) when East Timor is excluded from the ASEAN, even when it signaled a desire to join the institution in 2011, is an issue which Acharya overlooks.

In addition, although Acharya quotes historians extensively in Chapters 2 and 3 and acknowledges that trade fundamentally transformed Southeast Asia over time – creating a cosmopolitan culture and commercial prosperity – he also claims that the importance of trade in the making of Southeast Asia has not received sufficient scholarly attention (p. 75). This statement is surprising especially given that scholars such as Reid (who Acharya quotes in other sections) focused primarily on trade linkages between Southeast Asian polities prior to and during the arrival of the European colonizers. Moreover, Acharya’s decision to characterize pre-colonial polities of Southeast Asia as “states” is a point which historians may also dispute.

Acharya’s study recognizes synergies often neglected by other scholarly research on Southeast Asian region-building efforts. For instance, his identification of the “link between authoritarianism and regionalism” is a welcome addition in the text (p. 127). However, Acharya does not convincingly explain the link between the two. Although he argues that authoritarian trends in Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Philippines, and Indonesia became a source of solidarity, how this translated into a regional identity is not sufficiently discussed (p. 130). Another contention Acharya makes is that the movement away from the United States, particularly during the tenures of Marcos in Philippines and in Thailand in the 1960s is reflective of a growing “regionalism” (p. 130). This statement is debatable. The use of just two countries during specific period of time to claim that their tendency to wean themselves out of dependency from the United States created a sense of regionalism is misleading (p. 192). A similar issue arises with regard to Acharya’s claim that nonaligned Southeast Asian nations (using the examples of Indonesia and Malaysia) viewed the SEATO as a flawed approach to regional security. Conversely, he forgets to mention the fact that other Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand and Philippines who were members of the SEATO were also part of the nonaligned movement. To argue therefore, that nonaligned nations did not prefer to be associated with the SEATO is inaccurate (p. 137).

Acharya discusses at length the US exit from Indochina and the Nixon doctrine which impressed upon Southeast Asian states the necessity to develop regional security measures given the impending US disengagement from the mainland. In his view, the apprehensions generated by this possibility significantly influenced Southeast Asian nations to refrain from escalating existing bilateral disagreements and instead endeavor to enhance cooperation to meet common challenges.

Even so, the ASEAN faced significant internal challenges since its onset. A year after the ASEAN was formed, Philippines clashed with Malaysia over Sabah. ASEAN initially responded by “avoiding publicly voicing any views on the dispute”. As tensions increased ASEAN attempts to urge restraint eventually paid off as the two parties suspended hostile action against the other (p. 165). This example clearly shows how the ASEAN matured as it encountered significant bilateral disputes between its member states and through this process intensified regionalism which may have contributed to the engendering of a regional identity in Southeast Asia.

Although Acharya discusses Vietnam’s intervention into Cambodia at length (pages 180-190) he does not discuss the effect this had on the process of regionalism in Southeast Asia. He argues that for Southeast Asian states “it was China that posed the long-term threat to Southeast Asia; Vietnam could be a bulwark against Chinese expansionism” (p. 190). Even so, this was not a collectively adopted stance. Countries such as Singapore and Thailand “saw Vietnam as the main threat to regional peace and security” (p. 191). Therefore, this division in perception towards Vietnam may have driven significant wedges between ASEAN members. Unfortunately, Acharya’s account does not include an analysis on this topic.

Acharya’s discussion of Japan’s contribution to the economic development of Southeast Asia is often not included in other textbooks on Southeast Asian contemporary economic and political history (p. 203). This is another welcome addition to the body of scholarly work on Southeast Asia. However, in discussing this topic he does not sufficiently explain how the unique dynamics of decision making within the ASEAN (i.e., ASEAN Way) influences the regionalism process in Southeast Asia. This lacuna is also evident when Acharya outlines in Chapter 7 the importance that the ‘ASEAN Way’ mode of decision making played in the AFTA and other regional frameworks (including but not limited to the ASEAN Security Community, an ASEAN Economic Community and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community). Why ASEAN Way is unique to the region and the significance it has in engendering regional unity and consensus (pp. 225-6) is an interesting domain of study which Acharya could have delved a bit further into.

In the face of recent Chinese maneuvers in the South China Sea, Acharya contends, rather optimistically, that the ASEAN will take proactive measures to protect its constituent states interests and that the organization “would remain at the center of the evolving security apparatus in the Asia-Pacific” (p. 223). In hindsight, we can conclude that Acharya was mistaken given the predominant positions adopted by the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and the AUKUS Security initiative in matters concerning regional security.

Chapters 8 reads as a catch all segment where Acharya attempts to – rather haphazardly – sum up all the contemporary non-traditional security issues facing Southeast Asia. This treatment is problematic particularly because his attempt to discuss the challenges imposed by globalization, environmental governance, transnational terrorism, pandemics, and incursions by China into disputed maritime territory in a single chapter fails to do justice on any one issue. Not only is the reader not given any nuance but if s/he is not well versed on the problem, they may also fail to comprehend the unique features and gravity of the issue. The only exception to this is Acharya’s discussion of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 which originated in Southeast Asia.

In addition, by limiting his perspective to regional solutions (in particular, ASEAN based solutions) for trans-regional challenges like the Tsunami of 2004, Acharya limits the breadth of the solution to a specific geographical boundary instead of opting for a discussion of how regions and regional bodies can work collaboratively to tackle trans-regional challenges (p. 250). Finally, a significant omission in the text is Acharya’s decision to not discuss the ASEAN charter in detail and its implications on regionalism. Instead, he mentions in a single paragraph the adoption of a Charter without highlighting its significance for the organization or its contribution in building a regional identity (p. 258).

Therefore, even as the book can be recommended for students and academics on Southeast Asian affairs, it bears significant weaknesses. The main value in Acharya’s book is the fact that he complements existing narratives which point to the sense of “regionness” as an outcome of “proximity, shared history, similarities in culture and heritage as well as more dynamic variables such as commercial, strategic and political interactions before and after the colonial period” (pp. 209-10).

In sum, Acharya’s book is an engaging primer on the region written in clear and accessible prose. It is an impressive treatment of Southeast Asian regionalism, appropriate for students and scholars interested in Southeast Asian politics and international relations. To quote Beeson, “The idea that regions anywhere can be brought into being by the social practices of their members—or by the actions of elite policymakers, at least—is an important one and central to Acharya’s explanation of Southeast Asian development.”[1] Nevertheless, in addition to its many problems identified above, we are also not given any assurances of the region’s collective capacity to handle transnational threats it may face in future – in other words we are not compelled to deem that Southeast Asia, as a consequence of the creation of a regional identity, can be greater than the sum of its parts.

 

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[1] Mark Beeson, (2015) “The Making of Southeast Asia: International Relations of a Region”, Perspectives on Politics, 12(1), 275-276.

Mr. Shakthi de Silva 

Postgraduate candidate of the Lee Kuan School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore.

Recipient of Sirimavo Bandaranaike Award of the XIIIth Diploma in Diplomacy and World Affairs Course of the BIDTI