Sri
Lanka’s foreign policy has often been termed as being fundamentally nonaligned.
But what does ‘nonaligned’ really mean in the post-cold war era? Since the end
of the cold war, academic and scholarly publications have oft criticized the
ambiguity surrounding both the term and the membership of the nonaligned
movement. In this brief speech I don't intend to discuss or decipher what form
of nonalignment Sri Lanka followed in the past. I'm sure the diplomats present
here today have a better understanding than I do of the varied nuances of
previous administrations foreign policy. Instead I intend to re-define the
meaning of nonalignment as I perceive in the present administration’s foreign
policy.
The
present administration of Sri Lanka is focused on building amicable relations
with all countries. This has been repeatedly iterated by the president, prime
minster and the foreign minister on numerous occasions. I believe that the
present administration has redefined the import of the term nonaligned. This
new form of ‘nonalignment’ is not centered on a cold war mentality but instead,
is more focused on developing friendly ties with great and small powers to an
equal degree. As a small developing state, Sri Lanka’s friendly foreign
relations have supported the country's image as a peace-loving country which
wishes to engage with all states.
The
crux behind this foreign policy can be illustrated as one which encompasses; a
unified and interconnected security architecture. Establishing relations with great and small
powers - to a more or less equal degree - has enabled Sri Lanka to obtain
significant economic and financial support as well as other forms of
assistance. This new security architecture enables the island to have amicable
relations with all the major and small powers without being seen as being
aligned to any. Not only does this enable Sri Lanka to escape from creating a
security dilemma among the great powers but it also circumvents any external
pressures from neighboring and distant great powers.
I
also intend to briefly skim through some of the highpoints I have discerned
over the recent weeks with regard to Sri Lanka’s relations with the following
great powers: U.S.A, China, Russia and India.
Since
the regime change of 2015, relations with America have noticeably improved.
This is undoubtedly reflected in the government’s action of co-sponsoring two
resolutions on Human rights, accountability and reconciliation with the U.S.A. Present
cooperation on one of the most contentious issues between the former Sri Lankan
government and U.S.A; are a testament to this enhancement of ties. The first-ever
Pacific Partnership goodwill mission to Sri Lanka by America as well as the inaugural
US – Sri Lanka Partnership Dialogue reflects the American administration’s
desire to reset its relations with the island.
Relations
with Russia have also been amicable. Naturally the Sri Lanka Freedom Party to
which the present president belongs to, have had considerably good ties with
Russia since the cold war. The recent visit of the Sri Lankan president to
Moscow to meet President Putin and the latter’s gifting of a royal sword; is
symbolic of the enduring relationship between the two countries. I perceive the
timing of the visit as especially emblematic of the present presidents desire
to appear nonaligned; not only to the international community but also to the
domestic public.
2017
marks 60 years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China
and Sri Lanka as well as 65 years since the signing of the rubber-rice pact
between the two countries. This clearly emphasizes the historic connection
between the two countries. Although the present administration has recalibrated
its ties with China in contrast to the previous regime, ties are still strong
and will continue to remain so. General Chang Wanquan’s (Minister of Defense
and State Councilor of the People’s Republic of China) official visit to Sri
Lanka last week is a clear signal of this unchanging rapport.
Ties
with India and Sri Lanka have historically had its ups and downs. However a
noticeable feature of late is the strong personal ties that exist between the
Indian Prime Minister Modi and the Sri Lankan president. Although the Economic
and Technical Cooperation Agreement (ETCA) with India has had a recent spurge
of public protests I do not believe that the relationship between the two
governments and especially between the two presidents will undergo any
impairment in the foreseeable future. India’s decision to sign the Logistics
Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) with United States in 2016 (which gives
the militaries of both countries access to each other’s facilities for supplies
and repairs) as well as India's desire to enhance its maritime defense strategy
gives added reason why Sri Lanka should adopt a balanced foreign policy of
maintaining friendly ties with all countries; both near and far.
Among
the most important components of Sri Lanka’s foreign policy considerations must
be its closer great powers; China and India. While China’s economic assistance
is extremely important for the development of the country, India’s security
concerns must also be factored in such considerations. Conducting joint
military exercises with both countries - especially joint naval exercises - would
be a step that Sri Lanka could take to balance its ties with both countries.
To
sum up; the present regime has fashioned an altered formulation of nonalignment
which is aptly suited to the 21st century’s geopolitical challenges. This security architecture which is focused
on building amicable ties with great and small powers to an equal degree is
indubitably one of the best foreign policies that a small state such as Sri
Lanka could apply at present.
This note is an
adapted version of the views expressed by Shakthi De Silva at the invitation of
the Deputy Chief of Mission of the Embassy of the United States of America to
the diplomatic staff and officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials
on 03-04-2017. Shakthi De Silva
was the recipient of the Sirimavo Bandaranaike Memorial award for
excellent performance at the XIII Diploma in Diplomacy & World Affairs
Course of the BIDTI in 2016.
The opinions
expressed in this article are the author’s own and not the institutional views
of the BIDTI, nor do they necessarily reflect the position of any other institution
or individual with which the author is affiliated.
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